dburn

Haven't you rather diminished the value of that method by publishing the details on an internet newsgroup? Not necessarily, for future opponents will need to guess whether I am actually using the method as disclosed here, or whether I have reversed it so that I play low when vulnerable and high otherwise. However, the thought occurred to me that the vulnerability might not be a sufficiently random datum in this context. I have no statistical data with which to verify this hypothesis, but I conjecture that on balance you are more likely to be defending when you are vulnerable than when you are not. No doubt there is someone here who does have the necessary data, and I should be interested in any findings.

That's a flattering comparison, but I'm not sure that you're right. It's a lot easier to be a good player on the BBO forums than in real life. I was, in fact, West, and I'm fairly sure I played my clubs in ascending order. It's almost as important for West to randomise with xxx as it is for East to randomise with 10x. OK, this might have been the 1/3 of the time that I should play the lowest two, but I'm sure that in practice I do it more often than that. I think David Burn had my cards at the other table. It would be interesting to know whether he remembered to plays his clubs in a random order. I have some vague recollection of the deal, but to be honest I do not remember whether I was the player with three low clubs or the player with ♣Q10. I do remember thinking at some early stage in the play that declarer would take the club finesse and go down, but I do not remember any specific attempts to avoid dissuading him from this course. I am not sure, though, to what extent it is possible to "remember" to do something in random fashion. Human beings are particularly bad random number generators - if you ask someone to pick a number "at random" between one and ten, you will get the answer "seven" far more often than 10% of the time. If you find yourself in a position where you need to do (or appear to do) something "at random" and try to think consciously about how to do it, the chances are that you will fail. I do have a habit of trying to work out early in the course of a defence whether I will actually need to play equals in some random order; if so, I will use some external aid such as the vulnerability on a board - NV I will play low from QJ, VUL I will play high. I recall once having to play from J109 when declarer held Axx and dummy KQ8x. Since there are six orders in which one can play those cards, I took the board number modulo 6 and selected what turned out to be the order 10-9-J. That jack fell under dummy's queen, of course, and declarer said "I knew you were trying to fool me by petering with 10-9 to show a doubleton".

I do. I keep it on my mobile phone, so that I don't actually need a computer or a printed copy of the Orange Book when I want to look something up in the Orange Book.

Interesting. When needing 3 tricks I can see that playing A and low to the 9 is 100% line, but I don't see why playing a king when 4 tricks are needed is a blunder. The king is a common - probably the most common - of what is called a "danger play"; it guards against making the contract when West has the singleton queen. Since this is the only 4-1 break against which you can take four tricks, correct is low to the jack.

Worth another look, that combination: AJ32 K954 If, needing four tricks, you play the king, you have already blundered. If, needing three tricks, you play the king, you have also already blundered. If, needing two tricks, you play the king, this is not necessarily a blunder, although given your previous record no one would be particularly surprised to see you overtake it with the ace.

I think I'd rather bid 2♥ than 3♥. What, after all, am I going to do with all my losing diamonds?

I am. If I win the club in dummy and play a heart, and South wins with the ace and gives North a club ruff, how will I make the contract if North then shifts to a spade?

Try reading Jeff Rubens' latest book. Or even Jean-Marc Roudinesco's Dictionary of Suit Combinations, where such tables are explicitly shown. The reason they are not of much practical use, though, may be seen if we consider the actual calculations a player would need to perform. In the original example, it was said that at East's first turn to bid the auction was at such a level that he would never bid whatever his hand. This is rare, and if one places the original example within a context where East might bid, this is what you have to do: Call the chance that playing for the drop works D; call the chance that taking the finesse works F (of course, F = 1-D since one or the other line must work). Now, the relative probability of D is 11/21 (the chance that East has ♣KQ) multiplied by the chance (call it C10) that East would not bid with that club holding and ten red cards. The relative probability of F is 10/21 (the chance that East has a singleton club honour) multiplied by the chance (call it C11) that East would not bid with that club honour and eleven red cards. To recalculate the absolute probabilities of D and F, divide each by the sum of the newly calculated relative probabilities. Of course, no table exists in which you can look up the chance that any given East will enter the auction with any given hand - you must assess C10 and C11 subjectively. In general, players are more likely to bid with eleven cards in two suits than with ten; if you think it likely that East would bid with 60% of his possible 1=X=[11-X]=1 hands but only 50% of his possible 1=X=[10-X]=2 hands, you should finesse. In fact, and fairly obviously, you should finesse whenever you consider that C11/(C11+C10) > 11/21, because then F*C11 > D*C10. In the actual example C11=C10=1 (East would never bid whatever his hand), so there is no need to perform the above calculation and, as gnasher and Fred's odds checker say, you should play for the drop. That is, you should play for the drop unless you consider that West is less likely to have done whatever he did in the auction with six spades and two low clubs than with six spades and three clubs to an honour. How much less likely? Well, we will leave that as an exercise for the reader, whilst observing that unless the reader is unusually proficient at both mental arithmetic and assessing his opponents, he should incline to rely more on intuition than on mathematics.

Not in the least - looks reasonably fine to me. We can't answer the original question without knowing how many spades the opponents have between them, but as soon as we do know, we can give an answer based on gnasher's reasoning above. Of course, the vacant places analysis will need to take into account the "low-club" suit, on which we have a complete count, but that is a minor detail.

Can make a case for all the answers given, and some that are not given. But glad to see that the spirit of Douglas Hofstadter is alive and well and living on BBO.

Would open 1♦ and rebid 1NT over 1♠. Would do this even playing four-card majors. Can't pass, because I don't have anything resembling a satisfactory response if partner opens 1♠. See no reason not to hope to show the shape I have, as opposed to a shape I don't have. Don't understand rebidding 2♣ - how are we supposed to find a 4-4 fit when responder is 5-4 in the majors after that? Don't understand rebidding 2♦ either - holding 12 hcp and making my first two bids in a suit with none of them is to be avoided if possible.

Wot, no telephone? Sure I have a telephone. But it had not previously occurred to me that in order to give a Director's ruling, it was now a requirement to make a dozen phone calls at dinner time on a Friday evening. Has the EBU entered into some partnership with BT that I don't know about?

I suspect that they may be attempting to find a reason to be grateful that they won't be able to eat any more.

In my view, a hand that opens 1♣ in fourth chair ought not to be afraid to double with three-card heart support - if he were, he should have passed the hand out. If I double now, partner will pass on too many hands where we won't beat 2♦, and even if he does not, I am not going to try to land on a pinhead in 2♠. That leaves 3♣, so that is what I will bid.

Oh, the modern definition of LAs is not fierce at all. If for example the Director were to consider that cherdanno, peachy, Codo and gwnn are a sufficiently representative sample of players in the same class as South, then it is clear to rule that pass is not a LA. If on the other hand the Director were to consider that bluejak, gordontd, cardsharp and greenender are a sufficiently representative sample of players in the same class as South, then it is clear to rule that pass is a LA. What concerns me a little is how in the general case a Director is supposed to know to what class of players South belongs, and what other players constitute a representative sample of that class. That is, how is one supposed in the general case to "conduct a poll of peers of South as a bidding problem at South's second turn to call", as jallerton suggests? In practice, since there were no uninvolved players of South's class present at the time except for myself, Robert Sheehan and Gunnar Hallberg, I considered the three of us a representative sample of players in the same class as South. None of us would seriously consider passing (and believe me, if Sheehan and I don't pass, then no one should pass). So I ruled that pass was not a LA, and that the table result stood (which meant that the question of whether redouble was wild or gambling action did not arise). This was in effect a Director's ruling that could be appealed, and it would not particularly have surprised me if the decision had been reversed, but the match result rendered an appeal unnecessary. Formerly, of course, I would have had no difficulty at all in disallowing South's double per Law 73. But I'm not supposed to do that any more. Am I, Jeffrey?

1NT normal. 2♣ possible but misdirected. 1♠ horrible (imagine double-2♠-all pass, when you know you will be in an awful contract). Pass for wimps, and if the red suits were ♥Kx and ♦Qx, pass still for wimps. Ask any Italian.

Well that's a bit harsh. Also a bit exagerated. If the overcall shows the suit being bid (with or without any others) double is takeout, if it shows any other suit(s) then double is penalty interest of the suit(s) shown. I find a way to get by even when the meaning of my double is dependent on receiving a correct explanation of the overcall. Oh, everything I say is harsh, for I am a miserable sod, and exaggerated, for to get one's point across it is often necessary to belabour the obvious beyond recognizable limits. In truth, though, you and I will often be doing the same thing for the same reason: if I double 2♣ to show a takeout double of clubs, chances are I have at least one of the majors and the same hand as you would have to double 2♣ showing a desire to double two of a major for penalty. Where I find my method helpful, and where I am not sure what you would do, is when the opponents overcall (say) 2♣ to show one (unspecified) suit. My double is still takeout of clubs (in fact, my double is defined as Stayman, though opener will pass it only with clubs and bid 2♦ only with diamonds). What is yours?

Well, it was normal to finesse in clubs - South had bid a slam that he knew was off two aces, after all. He probably would not have done that with two losers in both black suits. Still, you did the right thing whenever it was your go, and you deserved your result. Well played.

If east has ♦KJ and four clubs, we will have to cash spades before clubs to squeeze him. And vice versa. So in practice east will only get squeezed if he has ♦KJ + four spades, not ♦KJ + four clubs, since it's logical to cash clubs first. Quite right - that ought to have been "East has ♠Jxxx and ♦KJ". Having read other posts now and given the matter more thought, perhaps it was a mistake to give up on the diamond finesse before I knew how the hearts would divide. For example, if East has four hearts then black-suit squeezes against him won't work unless West has seven diamonds, and if (as I presume) South opened a strong club, maybe West would have bid with those. For all that, I am pretty sure that at the table I would have played the line I gave in my earlier post. It has the significant advantage that in the vast majority of cases it saves me from having to think; moreover (depending on how much I have revealed about my hand during the bidding) it gives the opponents more chance to misdefend because they don't know what my actual problem is. Whether or not it would have worked I do not know, and I would not adopt it with a lower diamond than the ten in dummy. But in the final analysis, anyone who made the hand by taking the diamond finesse is either a much worse player than I am, or a much better one.

In principle the idea seems sensible; in practice it will require a lot of people to change a lot of habits for what may seem to them no particularly good reason. The question then is whether the game is worth the candle: that is, shall we implement a regulation to the effect that when the bidding has been 1NT all pass, some smartass can call the Director because South put the 1NT card back in the box before West made his opening lead? For myself, if the auction has lasted for more than a round or so of bidding, or if there is anything in the auction I think the leader should know about before he leads (particularly since barmy alerting regulations may have prevented him from finding out about it before he leads), I will not put my cards away until he has led. As a player, I hope that my partners and opponents would do likewise. As a legislator, I sure as shootin' don't want to write a regulation that compels them to do likewise.

Without looking at other answers or thinking too hard, would incline to win opening lead, cash ♦A and (if ♦K has not appeared) draw trumps pitching diamonds, play ♣AKQ, ♠KA and the last heart, reducing to: [hv=d=s&n=sxh10d10c&s=sq10hdcx]133|200|Scoring: IMP[/hv] Fails at once if diamonds are 8-0, but someone might have bid in that case. Succeeds by force if: Someone has ♠J singleton or doubleton (13 top tricks); Clubs are 3-3 (thirteen different top tricks); Someone has ♦K singleton (thirteen different different top tricks); East has five or more spades (marked finesse); East has four cards in each black suit (show-up squeeze); East has four cards in one black suit and ♦KJ (different show-up squeeze); West has ♦KJ and four or more spades (simple squeeze). Also succeeds if none of the above applies, but I can guess spades in the ending. Total chance of success not easy to compute, but estimated as around 90% even with my legendary inability to guess correctly in a two-card ending.

Some people prefer to play that double should be for takeout of the suit they've bid, regardless of what it means. Over 2♣ showing the majors, for example, they'd double with short clubs, but with club length they'd pass planning to make a takeout double on the next round. I wish I could explain the benefits of this approach, but I have no idea what they are. Advantage number 1: you do not have to worry what the opponents' bidding means. If double of, say, 2♦ is defined as "takeout of diamonds" however 2♦ itself is defined, then [a] partner knows at once what you have and the vast majority of opponents have no idea what to do. "You do realise" said some patronising twit only the other day "that my partner doesn't have to have diamonds?" Informed that we neither knew nor cared whether his partner had diamonds, he spent the next three minutes trying to work out what it would mean if he passed over the double, and the three after that watching his partner go down five in 2♦ doubled on a 3-2 fit. If you want to play double as one thing over Multi, another thing over Woolsey, a third thing over Astro, a fourth thing over... well, the best of luck to your partner. You don't deserve any. Advantage number 2: later actions in murky sequences become much easier to interpret. An example that occurred rather longer ago than the one above was this sequence: 1NT-2♥ (both majors)-Pass-2♠-Pass-Pass-3♥. I don't know what your partner would think you had for that auction, but mine knew that I had five hearts, short spades, and a good hand. So he raised to 4♥, which made despite what turned out to be only a 4-1 break, but I could have coped with 5-0. At the other table the auction started 1NT-2♣ (both majors), but the opponents did not have a way to play in hearts after this start, and no other game had a chance. Advantage number 3: it works even when the opponents do not have what they are supposed to have for their bidding. Sometimes they forget their methods; sometimes they have a liberal interpretation of what constitutes a "two-suiter" (4-3 or even 3-3 are becoming popular with the cool school); sometimes they just psyche. We don't care - if we have doubled (say) hearts for takeout, then bids of hearts by us are cue bids and doubles of everything else are penalty. Advantage number 4: even I can't forget the system.

LHO did indeed continue with the ace of hearts.

I am not sure I follow this. Are you really suggesting that "the average club player" does not know what 1♣-Pass2♣-Double shows in terms of values? I presume, but cannot be certain, that this incident occurred in Australia. I do not know what alerting regulations they have Down Under, but I know the regulations we have in England: and: Do average club players in England know much more than those in Australia, so that an English player must know (and disclose) what constitutes an "unusually weak hand" while an Australian will have "little idea"? If not, why do we have these regulations at all?

If you ruff a diamond, South will show out. His original spade holding was ♠J8.