this didn't happen until...

[mikeh]

not quite, but not bad... i'm saying that when the materialist denies the existence of entities not suspended in space and time her worldview is internally inconsistent... iow, she would have to say that things like morality are subjective, that they are like governments - elected or coerced

I'm also comfortable with your reasoning about the concept of beauty. Do you feel the same way about concepts like goodness and morality, or would you group those concepts together with logic?

there are concepts that are subjective, and it's my feeling that beauty is one of those (as i said, i could be wrong)... it's also my view that morality is objective - an act is either 'right' or 'wrong' in an objective sense... 2 people could look at the same piece of art and disagree over its beauty... i believe one or both could be right (or wrong), or neither could be right (or wrong)... they could also disagree about the morality of a certain act and both could not be right... what makes beauty and morality different in my mind is that i consider one to be objective and one subjective

I don't understand this...oh.. I understand that you believe it... but I don't understand the reasoning.

You limit the possibilities... and then you pick one out of the (incomplete) set of choices. This is exactly the error into which Lewis fell. You state, with no evidentiary explanation, that morality must be ONE of : objective or elected/coerced.

 

Why not entertain the possibility that a sense of morality... that is, the innate ability to feel a sort of moral compass... is an evolved characteristic. But the precise message that this compass will send.. the direction in which it will point, is influenced not only by the 'hard-wiring' patterns imposed on the growing brain by evolution but also the patterns inculcated by culture.

 

What we see as a sense of morality seems fairly easy to explain in this sense, to me at least. We are social animals. We are social animals with a high degree of complexity in our brains and in our interactions and relatively few natural weapons... small, weak jaws... not very fast, no claws etc. We presumably became the dominant 'large' animal due to our brains and, as part of that, our social relationships. Loyalty, the ability to give and accept favours, kinship altruism, the ability to detect lying, all seem to be some of the components of our moral sense, and these seem to have adaptative uses. And the areas where morality appears to be absent... in sociopaths.. is also fascinating, in terms of how sociopathy could evolve.

 

That, as a species, we generally share a basic moral sense (other than sociopaths) seems reasonably certain. That that moral sense varies across cultures, and across history, in some aspects also seems pretty obvious.

 

So why not entertain the notion that the moral sense is founded on hard-wiring in the brain, as a result of selection pressures operating on our ancestral population, modified by cultural factors? It is thus both objective, to some degree, and subjective.. it is inherent in our brains yet subject to modification by consensus or indoctrination.

[PassedOut]

That, as a species, we generally share a basic moral sense (other than sociopaths) seems reasonably certain. That that moral sense varies across cultures, and across history, in some aspects also seems pretty obvious.

 

So why not entertain the notion that the moral sense is founded on hard-wiring in the brain, as a result of selection pressures operating on our ancestral population, modified by cultural factors? It is thus both objective, to some degree, and subjective.. it is inherent in our brains yet subject to modification by consensus or indoctrination.

Although I agree completely with you on this, I believe I understand why Jimmy won't entertain that notion: To accept your proposition would contradict his strongly held worldview, so why spend time entertaining the idea?

 

On its face, that approach sounds narrow-minded, but the truth is that I do something very similar. It's like when we were kids learning arithmetic. We learn how to estimate the approximate result of a calculation and reject any result that diverges greatly from the estimate.

 

It seems to me that Jimmy takes an ontological view based on premisses he considers well justified. He estimates in advance that any proposition that contradicts his ontological view must be wrong. That might sound weird, but some pretty good mathematicians have made ontological arguments.

 

In my case, I can safely say that I don't accept the premisses of any logically valid ontological proof of the existence of god, so I don't spend time trying to identify the holes in such arguments (although I'm sure I could).

 

It doesn't bother me that people hold strong religious beliefs that I find preposterous. When religious beliefs encourage folks to respect others, to feed the hungry, to work for peace, and so on, that's positive. I respect Jimmy Carter, for example, although I don't accept Christianity.

 

It bothers me a lot, though, when religious beliefs encourage folks to hate others, to approve of war and killing, and to mislead children about science. That's negative and immoral (whether or not you believe morality is subjective). My estimate is that any religion that does so can be rejected out of hand.

[Winstonm]

I can understand how a conceptual god could afford an objectiive morality to the universe. What I don't quite grasp is how the worshipers of such a god could document over time mores that are not consistent with mores of today. A simple example comes to mind from the bible about how earlier worshipers had mulitple wives and/or concubines (King David comes to mind). If morality is objective, this was either right or wrong at that time.

 

Yet these actions appear by the texts to have been morally acceptible to ancient societies while being morally unacceptable to modern man.

 

it's also my view that morality is objective - an act is either 'right' or 'wrong' in an objective sense

 

This is the worldview I have meant when I used the phrase black-and-white. It is a binary worldview that IMO simplifies the complex beyond the reduction possible for a solution.

 

The very word evolve means to change, alter, or adapt, and you agreed earlier in this thread that a worldview should not be rigid - yet more than any other component of your worldview, a binary morality model is of its nature rigid - it forces action choices to be measured against whether something is black (circuit closed) or white (circuit open).

 

A binary morality must by its nature be judgemental. Action is either right or wrong.

 

The fallacy in this worldview of morality is that if we believe ourselves and thus our actions to be aligned with the God-being then our actions are always morally just - and any opposition action is thus immoral and unjust. It leads to statements like, You are with us or with the terrorists.

 

Problem is, there is no provision for both sides being wrong.

 

I also do not follow how if abstract concepts such as logic and morality are extensions of the god-being and therefore have the weight of Law how we can see illogic and immorality. After all, the Law of Gravity does not allow me to jump and stay airborn. So it seems to me that if Laws of Logic and Moral Laws are present because they are extensions of a god-being, then the god-being must also contain illogic and immorality as part of his/her/its makeup. Otherwise, they could not exist.

[Winstonm]

It bothers me a lot, though, when religious beliefs encourage folks to hate others, to approve of war and killing, and to mislead children about science. That's negative and immoral (whether or not you believe morality is subjective). My estimate is that any religion that does so can be rejected out of hand.

 

Doesn't religion this critical to its believer mean virtually the same thing as worldview? When we say the religion is rejected, don't we also reject the worldview? When we reject someone's worldview, we tend to get defensive responses - that would be normal.

 

What we have to do is educate the masses (I mean worldwide) so they may create a worldview that is consistent with their own experiences, beliefs, and knowledge instead of passing along worldviews from a pulpit.

[helene_t]

Non-material concepts such as beauty exist

What exactly do you mean by that?

 

Suppose I play the devil's advocate and claim that the Eiffel Tower doesn't exist, and that beauty doesn't exist. The first one we settle by going to Paris and see if it's there. Probably either of us will admit being wrong. Maybe not - it could be that we see something which you claim is the Eiffel Tower while I claim it isn't, but to make my claim meaningful I would have to specify exactly what I don't expect to find.

 

Is it possible to devise an experiment that would settle the existence of beauty? Maybe it is. But if not, the claim seems meaningless to me.

 

Btw, you say that non-material "concepts" exist. Material concepts can exist independently of what the refer to - the Loch Ness monster exists as a concept, as do red herrings. Of course, "beauty" exists as a concept, at least to speakers of English and probably all other languages. But what, if anything, does it mean to assert the existence of beauty itself, as distinct from the concept of beauty?

[PassedOut]

Non-material concepts such as beauty exist

What exactly do you mean by that?

 

Suppose I play the devil's advocate and claim that the Eiffel Tower doesn't exist, and that beauty doesn't exist. The first one we settle by going to Paris and see if it's there. Probably either of us will admit being wrong. Maybe not - it could be that we see something which you claim is the Eiffel Tower while I claim it isn't, but to make my claim meaningful I would have to specify exactly what I don't expect to find.

 

Is it possible to devise an experiment that would settle the existence of beauty? Maybe it is. But if not, the claim seems meaningless to me.

I simply mean that we identify some things as having more beauty and other things as having less beauty. That's not to say that any two people classify things uniformly. In my experience, most folks have a general idea of the concept of beauty, even when they classify objects differently.

 

I'm used to considering concepts as non-material, because that fits nicely with the way I work. I don't see that classifications are anything but mental tools that are worthwhile when useful.

 

It certainly isn't reasonable to draw any conclusions about reality from a classification system other than whether or not the is system useful in a given situation. If there is some strong reason to say that it is wrong to consider concepts such as beauty as non-material, I'll be happy to listen and mend my ways.

[luke warm]

not quite, but not bad... i'm saying that when the materialist denies the existence of entities not suspended in space and time her worldview is internally inconsistent... iow, she would have to say that things like morality are subjective, that they are like governments - elected or coerced

I'm also comfortable with your reasoning about the concept of beauty. Do you feel the same way about concepts like goodness and morality, or would you group those concepts together with logic?

there are concepts that are subjective, and it's my feeling that beauty is one of those (as i said, i could be wrong)... it's also my view that morality is objective - an act is either 'right' or 'wrong' in an objective sense... 2 people could look at the same piece of art and disagree over its beauty... i believe one or both could be right (or wrong), or neither could be right (or wrong)... they could also disagree about the morality of a certain act and both could not be right... what makes beauty and morality different in my mind is that i consider one to be objective and one subjective

I don't understand this...oh.. I understand that you believe it... but I don't understand the reasoning.

You limit the possibilities... and then you pick one out of the (incomplete) set of choices. This is exactly the error into which Lewis fell. You state, with no evidentiary explanation, that morality must be ONE of : objective or elected/coerced.

 

Why not entertain the possibility that a sense of morality... that is, the innate ability to feel a sort of moral compass... is an evolved characteristic. But the precise message that this compass will send.. the direction in which it will point, is influenced not only by the 'hard-wiring' patterns imposed on the growing brain by evolution but also the patterns inculcated by culture.

i think i did say that when i used the word 'subjective'... any time the same act can be seen as either good or bad, subjectivity enters into it... when you say that morality can be culture-based, what can that be but subjective?

It bothers me a lot, though, when religious beliefs encourage folks to hate others, to approve of war and killing, and to mislead children about science. That's negative and immoral (whether or not you believe morality is subjective). My estimate is that any religion that does so can be rejected out of hand.

and i agree with you on this... i think i answered the portion of mike's post that you quoted

The fallacy in this worldview of morality is that if we believe ourselves and thus our actions to be aligned with the God-being then our actions are always morally just - and any opposition action is thus immoral and unjust.  It leads to statements like, You are with us or with the terrorists.

this is not true... it does not follow that since God is good his believers must also be good... i don't think you actually meant to say this

What we have to do is educate the masses (I mean worldwide) so they may create a worldview that is consistent with their own experiences, beliefs, and knowledge instead of passing along worldviews from a pulpit.

i suspect you might want to rethink this, also

[Winstonm]

when the materialist denies the existence of entities not suspended in space and time her worldview is internally inconsistent... iow, she would have to say that things like morality are subjective, that they are like governments - elected or co

 

Hey Jimmy,

 

Enlighten me, please. I am not being glib. You and the other debaters have such an educational advantage over me it is laughable - I am trained in and rely solely on critical thinking to produce my thoughts in these threads. Compared to most others, my educational level (ADN) would be classified rudimentary. So when I ask a question or challenge an assertion it is from my reasoning prowesses only and is surely based on subject ignorance. Fair enough?

 

It seems to me your statement above would have more to do with the creative process of morality - that if morality is evolved as MikeH seems to argue, there is no inconsistency to the argument.

 

The argument, so it seems to me, would be whether or not an evolved concept could become objective or be treated as objective by choice or necessity or some combination of both.

 

If that could occur, then it seems that would cause an internal inconsistency in your argument for absolute morality.

 

Is my reasoning grossly flawed, here?

[Winstonm]

The fallacy in this worldview of morality is that if we believe ourselves and thus our actions to be aligned with the God-being then our actions are always morally just - and any opposition action is thus immoral and unjust.  It leads to statements like, You are with us or with the terrorists.

 

 

this is not true... it does not follow that since God is good his believers must also be good... i don't think you actually meant to say this

 

I did not say what you are refuting. Let me rephrase. IF Believers consider themselves to be aligned with the God-being then their actions in keeping with that belief are in their minds always morally justfiied.

 

If we are knowingly acting Badly we obviously cannot believe our actions or ourselves are aligned at that time with the God-being. A Christian does not believe his actions are aligned with his god when he murders his spouse, so the action is not justified; that same Christian may well believe his actions are morally justified because he is defending Christianity and a corrrect-god-fearing country against the evils of Islam when in he drops a bomb from a plane and kills an Iraqi housewife who happened to live next door to a suspected terrorist location.

 

Belief of alignment with the God-bing is what leads to following the Talmud's instructions for overkill of the enemy when at war and for Islam's jihads.

 

I don't see any reason to rethink or alter the position.

[luke warm]

when the materialist denies the existence of entities not suspended in space and time her worldview is internally inconsistent... iow, she would have to say that things like morality are subjective, that they are like governments - elected or co

It seems to me your statement above would have more to do with the creative process of morality - that if morality is evolved as MikeH seems to argue, there is no inconsistency to the argument.

 

The argument, so it seems to me, would be whether or not an evolved concept could become objective or be treated as objective by choice or necessity or some combination of both.

 

If that could occur, then it seems that would cause an internal inconsistency in your argument for absolute morality.

 

Is my reasoning grossly flawed, here?

if morality is evolved, as mike says, then it is subjective... if subjective, it is conventional... to use a very tired analogy, at one time (even now, i suppose) one group of people thought it was right, maybe even good, to destroy the jewish race... now another group thought it was bad (or wrong)... what that means, if morality is subjective, is that destroying the jewish race is either good or bad depending on ones culture or, if might does make right, on who wins

 

btw you are every bit as intelligent as anyone else posting on these threads... if you're under any kind of handicap, i certainly can't see it

IF Believers consider themselves to be aligned with the God-being then their actions in keeping with that belief are in their minds always morally justfiied.

 

If we are knowingly acting Badly we obviously cannot believe our actions and thus ourselves to be aligned with the God-being at that time.

 

Belief of alignment with the God-bing is what leads to following the Talmud's instructions for overkill of the enemy when at war and for Islam's jihads.

yes i did misunderstand you... of course it's always possible for a human to be wrong, either in her understanding of what a text means or in the holiness of the text itself... even so, that says nothing about the objectivity or subjectivity of morality

[orlam]

I had never seen this thread before, I like the law very much and don't understand Winston's cynicism about it.

However, I think the law is way too specific, it should be reworded so that it applies to any controversial scientific topics. Just to give some examples, it should allow every teacher to

- present any evidence for and against the earth being flat,

- give the students a chance to see both sides of the debate whether Obama is a Muslim, and

- encourage an open debate, based on all facts pointing to one side or the other, on the question whether Pi is equal to 3.

 

I am not sure how it should be worded, though. Making the wording too general might give an excuse to those crooks in schools all over the place who fail to give clear guidance on critical issues such as sex before marriage, or already make up "free-speech" excuses to have class-room debates on legalizing marihuana.

[helene_t]

I simply mean that we identify some things as having more beauty and other things as having less beauty. That's not to say that any two people classify things uniformly. In my experience, most folks have a general idea of the concept of beauty, even when they classify objects differently.

 

I'm used to considering concepts as non-material, because that fits nicely with the way I work. I don't see that classifications are anything but mental tools that are worthwhile when useful.

Thanks.

 

If I say I don't believe in beauty it might mean that I don't believe in any correlation between what one person finds beautiful and what another person finds beautiful. Or it may mean that I don't believe in aesthetic appreciation as an behavorial phenomena, or that I don't believe in it as a mental state.

 

Does that make it something material or immaterial? I don't know what those terms mean so I can't say. I have a suspicion that the terms originated in a time where we had a naive understanding of the physical World, as composed of things that have mass and texture, and all the dynamics as well as light, smell, and thoughts were immaterial. As science progresses, the dynamics of the physical world became largely understood, and light and electricity is probably "material" to modern people. Today we understand life as well as the basics of what is going on in the human brain, so what is left "immaterial"? As MikeH points out, ethics and aestethics can be studied scientifically.

 

Maybe the concepts "material" and "immaterial" are useful in a different meaning from what I suspect they mean to most people. But I never use them myself, to me they seem to be archaic concepts.

[Winstonm]

if morality is evolved, as mike says, then it is subjective... if subjective, it is conventional... to use a very tired analogy, at one time (even now, i suppose) one group of people thought it was right, maybe even good, to destroy the jewish race... now another group thought it was bad (or wrong)... what that means, if morality is subjective, is that destroying the jewish race is either good or bad depending on ones culture or, if might does make right, on who wins

 

I do not grasp why you say Evolved=Subjective yet Theist=Objective. If you are claiming that morality is objective, how can the premise be based on personal belief? I always thought the difference between objective and subjective was in measurability. I like my women to be at least 5'8" versus I like tall women.

 

As for your analogy, I don't think it is valid. I believe it is more about psychology than philosophy. In the case of the holocaust - as well as many other horrific crimes - the authority was either a sociopath or was someome with strong rationalization characteristtics who was able to self-delude into belief that the actions were justified by some greater good.

 

Let's not use the Jews as that subject has a lot of emotion attached. Let's use the Dutch - they are up for anything. :lol:

 

Let's say science discovered that the Dutch were carriers of a disease that would wipe out all human life except the Dutch. Would the rest of the world have the moral right of Dutch genocide as self--defense?

[PassedOut]

If I say I don't believe in beauty it might mean that I don't believe in any correlation between what one person finds beautiful and what another person finds beautiful. Or it may mean that I don't believe in aesthetic appreciation as an behavorial phenomena, or that I don't believe in it as a mental state.

I had to leave before I finished my last post (Constance and I went to admire the snow sculptures at the university), so I left out the example I had planned to give in response to your Eiffel tower existence experiment.

 

Consider the proposition "Molde, Norway is a beautiful city." Many people affirm that, and I concur. (My grandfather claimed that Molde was the most beautiful city in the world, but I know for a fact that he had not visited every city. :lol: ) Come to think of it, I've never heard anyone say Molde is not beautiful, although I suppose some do.

 

So its hard for me to fathom that you would find no correlation between what different people consider beautiful. What about very colorful sunsets, for another example?

[helene_t]

Consider the proposition "Molde, Norway is a beautiful city." Many people affirm that, and I concur. (My grandfather claimed that Molde was the most beautiful city in the world, but I know for a fact that he had not visited every city. :lol: ) Come to think of it, I've never heard anyone say Molde is not beautiful, although I suppose some do.

 

So its hard for me to fathom that you would find no correlation between what different people consider beautiful. What about very colorful sunsets, for another example?

Yes, that version of beauty-denial (no correlation) is the easiest one to reject, I agree with that :)

[luke warm]

if morality is evolved, as mike says, then it is subjective... if subjective, it is conventional... to use a very tired analogy, at one time (even now, i suppose) one group of people thought it was right, maybe even good, to destroy the jewish race... now another group thought it was bad (or wrong)... what that means, if morality is subjective, is that destroying the jewish race is either good or bad depending on ones culture or, if might does make right, on who wins

 

I do not grasp why you say Evolved=Subjective yet Theist=Objective. If you are claiming that morality is objective, how can the premise be based on personal belief? I always thought the difference between objective and subjective was in measurability. I like my women to be at least 5'8" versus I like tall women.

 

As for your analogy, I don't think it is valid. I believe it is more about psychology than philosophy. In the case of the holocaust - as well as many other horrific crimes - the authority was either a sociopath or was someome with strong rationalization characteristtics who was able to self-delude into belief that the actions were justified by some greater good.

i could have used any number of analogies to show that if morality is a product of evolution it is subjective (based on consensus)... there are people who argue that very thing, and that's fine (i've heard people say, for example, that cannibalism is moral in some cultures and not others - or slavery for that matter)... i think people might say that morality is subjective, but they don't live as if it is... and i didn't say that theist=objective, i said that i can account for objective morality from within my worldview while your worldview can't (meaning, morality must be subjective in yours)

Let's say science discovered that the Dutch were carriers of a disease that would wipe out all human life except the Dutch.  Would the rest of the world have the moral right of Dutch genocide as self--defense?

i say no... what do you say?

[Winstonm]

i could have used any number of analogies to show that if morality is a product of evolution it is subjective (based on consensus)... there are people who argue that very thing, and that's fine (i've heard people say, for example, that cannibalism is moral in some cultures and not others - or slavery for that matter)... i think people might say that morality is subjective, but they don't live as if it is... and i didn't say that theist=objective, i said that i can account for objective morality from within my worldview while your worldview can't (meaning, morality must be subjective in yours)

 

Again, Jimmy, perhaps my understanding of the word objective is different than what you mean, but it seems to me that the very theist definition of god is the validation for objective morality, something like, God is totally just therefore moral concepts are based on absolutes of justness. However, as the entire concept of god is unmeasurable how can morality based on an unmeasurable be termed objective?

 

Sorry, but I may simply be slow here.

 

Edit: I am trying. I got this discussion while trying to find if my understanding of subjective/objective was close to yours:

 

Of course, the degree to which any objectivity can be achieved - and, hence, whether or not the distinction between objective and subjective really exists - is a matter of great debate in philosophy. Many argue that true objectivity cannot be achieved except perhaps in matters like mathematics while everything else must be reduced to degrees of subjectivity

 

That seems a good explanation for the conundrum I sensed but could not explain very well. If morality can be called objective, how can it be validated in argument by a subjective premise - and vice-versa?

 

QUOTE 

Let's say science discovered that the Dutch were carriers of a disease that would wipe out all human life except the Dutch.  Would the rest of the world have the moral right of Dutch genocide as self--defense?

 

 

i say no... what do you say?

 

 

I say it is clearly a difficult question. We have something like 7 Billion world population with let's say 18 million Dutch. If the proof were absolute, I would say yes, the fewer can be sacrificed for the greater good - but would hope the Dutch would volunteer instead of going to war to stop us.

[PassedOut]

Does that make it something material or immaterial? I don't know what those terms mean so I can't say. I have a suspicion that the terms originated in a time where we had a naive understanding of the physical World, as composed of things that have mass and texture, and all the dynamics as well as light, smell, and thoughts were immaterial. As science progresses, the dynamics of the physical world became largely understood, and light and electricity is probably "material" to modern people. Today we understand life as well as the basics of what is going on in the human brain, so what is left "immaterial"? As MikeH points out, ethics and aestethics can be studied scientifically.

 

Maybe the concepts "material" and "immaterial" are useful in a different meaning from what I suspect they mean to most people. But I never use them myself, to me they seem to be archaic concepts.

Your comment here reminds me that for a couple of years as a student I refused to use the words "mind" and "thinking" (1) because many people still drew an archaic distinction between mind and body and (2) because thoughts were not (then) observable or measurable. Later I reversed that policy to avoid stilted conversations and because age mellowed me some, but not because I changed my opinion.

 

Before now, though, I've never really questioned the distinction between the material and non-material. (I use "non-material" because "immaterial" has a common usage as "not germane.") You might be right, but I've got some questions.

 

Suppose you define a set by stating a rule, such as the set of all living humans over 80 years of age on January 1, 2009. I'm curious as to whether you consider the rule itself (not the membership of the set) to be material or non-material.

 

I've always considered such a rule to be non-material because you can express the same rule in many different ways and (to me) the rule remains the same. In fact, the rule as written was the same when I formulated it prior to writing it down.

 

In view of that, I'm wondering how the rule itself can be considered material at all. Similarly I classify all concepts as non-material. But I'm willing to learn...

[helene_t]

Suppose you define a set by stating a rule, such as the set of all living humans over 80 years of age on January 1, 2009. I'm curious as to whether you consider the rule itself (not the membership of the set) to be material or non-material.

I can think of the rule in two ways:

 

1) As a pattern in the way we perceive reality. Since human perception is a physical phenomena it is material.

 

2) As a concept introduced in a particular formal model of the universe. This tastes like mathematics, which means that it cannot "exist" in the way physical objects exist (existence is different in mathematics, as I see it).

 

Maybe there should be something between maths and physics, maybe the concept of existence has a third meaning in "applied math", and we could define objects (or concepts if you prefer) that exist in the applied-math realm as being non-material. I am unsure about this. I can't refer to any particular texts from the history of philosophy, maybe I am just making it up.

 

My immediate thought is that as far as the real world is concerned, the rule (predicate?) that generate a set is interchangeable with the set itself. IOW it doesn't matter if we describe the world in terms of predicates or in terms of sets. So if the set of 80+ YO people is material, so is the rule that defines the set.

[PassedOut]

My immediate thought is that as far as the real world is concerned, the rule (predicate?) that generate a set is interchangeable with the set itself. IOW it doesn't matter if we describe the world in terms of predicates or in terms of sets. So if the set of 80+ YO people is material, so is the rule that defines the set.

But if the rule is interchangeable with the set, how do we account for the fact that many different rules can define the same set?

 

Suppose that the two tallest trees on earth are also the two oldest trees on earth.

[luke warm]

 

Let's say science discovered that the Dutch were carriers of a disease that would wipe out all human life except the Dutch.  Would the rest of the world have the moral right of Dutch genocide as self--defense?

 

i say no... what do you say?

I say it is clearly a difficult question. We have something like 7 Billion world population with let's say 18 million Dutch. If the proof were absolute, I would say yes, the fewer can be sacrificed for the greater good - but would hope the Dutch would volunteer instead of going to war to stop us.

i think maybe this can put everything in perspective... your answer to the question is "it depends" or "maybe" (on the validity of the proof.. and let me know if this isn't correct)... now change the scientific discovery from the dutch being carriers of a killer disease to them being the carriers of virus that causes blindness... still have them murdered? how about if their virus causes runny noses?

 

iow, the murder of 18 million dutch is not in and of itself immoral, to you... the end justifies the means... i see it as immoral... now that doesn't mean i am right and you wrong, but it should point out what i mean by subjective morality

[Winstonm]

iow, the murder of 18 million dutch is not in and of itself immoral, to you... the end justifies the means... i see it as immoral... now that doesn't mean i am right and you wrong, but it should point out what i mean by subjective morality

 

Yes. Although I would say instead that the needs of the many outweighs the needs of the few rather than ends justifying the means. The ends justifying the means to me says there were other options - in the scenario I gave I pointed out that if the Dutch lived the rest of the world would die - no other options. It was a strict black/white, yes/no scenario. And it also helps with the concept that you term objective morality (although I don't know how - even with your understanding of it - how it can be truly objective when it is non-verifiable)

 

As you know I have not been schooled in logic of formal argument - but my reading suggests that the term objective is not uniformly accepted in among philosophers - that many believe only things such as mathematics can be truly objective.

 

Now let me ask you a moral question or two. Are the deaths of the civilians in Afghanistan from drones dropping bombs morally justified?

Is killing as self-defense morally justified?

Is capital punishment morally justified?

[helene_t]

My immediate thought is that as far as the real world is concerned, the rule (predicate?) that generate a set is interchangeable with the set itself. IOW it doesn't matter if we describe the world in terms of predicates or in terms of sets. So if the set of 80+ YO people is material, so is the rule that defines the set.

But if the rule is interchangeable with the set, how do we account for the fact that many different rules can define the same set?

 

Suppose that the two tallest trees on earth are also the two oldest trees on earth.

Arghhh why did I get myself involved in this discussion :mellow:

 

"The two tallest trees" differ, as a rule, from "the two oldest trees" only when one considers the hypothetical event that they were not the same. I think.

 

Maybe one day I will check out what the famous guys from the history of philosophy thought about this.

[helene_t]

my reading suggests that the term objective is not uniformly accepted in among philosophers - that many believe only things such as mathematics can be truly objective.

One should probably start by defining the concept "objective". Of course this has been done before and there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but it means one thing in legal jargon, another thing in psychiatrics, and probably umpteen different things in different jargons. You may also want to google on "local realism", I think that's related to how physicists think about objectivity of observable quantities.

 

present any evidence for and against the earth being flat

You are sarcastic, but seriously, is it desirable that politicians micro-manage schools at this level? Just asking, maybe what is unnecessary for politicians to get involved with in Europe is necessary in the U.S.

 

It may be worth a discussion whether teachers should confuse students with controversies, or whether they should pretend that scientists agree on everything. Ken's example with even numbers that can be written as sums of two primes is a cool example of why research in pure math is still warranted, but how old should children be before it is a good idea to spend time on such issues? Personally I think it is something young children (say 8 years) need to be told, but not something to spend much time on before college. Other examples could be the meteorite hypothesis of the extermination of the dinosaurs, or the end of the Indus civilization. And global warming of course.

[PassedOut]

"The two tallest trees" differ, as a rule, from "the two oldest trees" only when one considers the hypothetical event that they were not the same. I think.

Often we work with set-defining rules without knowing the precise membership of the set. Sometimes the specific membership varies over time for a given rule. It would be inconvenient for two different rules to be interchangeable at one time and not interchangeable at another.

 

For these reasons (and more) I personally find it useful to distinguish between the rules and the members of the set. Consequently I'm prejudiced toward the opinion that this distinction reflects reality.

 

But I'm also interested in learning about the situations in which making this distinction is a hindrance.

 

If you decide to read about this kind of thing, the old books by Russell and/or Whitehead were once my favorites.