mikestar13

Should be a slight correction of these odds. 37% is just a bit too thin: These are correct odds if and only if spades makes exactly 9 or 10 tricks, the defense doesn't vary if the contract is 3♠ or 4♠, and the contract is never doubled. I'd want about a 40% chance, myself. Most of the variables favor aggression, however. The bold jump to 4♠ may inhibit the opponents from a double they ought to make; if they don't double and there is a reasonable chance that 8 tricks are the limit on a badly-splitting hand, the needed odds go down.OTOH, if they do double ... (That's why I don't particularly care for 37% games. Neither did Jeff Rubens in The Secrets of Winning Bridge.)

Not under any Law, but under (admittedly blindingly stupid) ACBL regulation, which the Laws allow regulating authorities to make, at least arguably. Not any kind of violation in the sane bridge jurisdictions of the world.

The takeout double is a convention (though it predates Contract Bridge)--the natural meaning of a double is "I don't think they can make it, let's increase the stakes" ; therefor any conventional defense to a takeout double is allowed (unless specifically excluded by the General Convention Chart, which none are WRT takeout doubles). So in the sequence 1♥-X-z any meaning for any call z is allowable (as long as properly disclosed).

The terminology as I learned it (ACBL Official Encyclopedia of Bridge): Namyats: 4♣ opening = strong 4♥ opening, for whichever definition of strong the partnership has. 4♦ opening = strong 4♠ opening. Normally combined with 3NT = 4 minor opening. South African Texas (SAT): 4♣ response to 1NT/2NT = transfer to hearts. 4♦ response to 1NT/2NT = transfer to spades. I suppose that 3NTopening = strong major 4 opening might be called "reverse namyats" (This treatment is not legal on the ACBL General Convention Chart unless the major is solid.) Terminology may well vary in other countries, which is why the regulating authorities tell us we should say what the bid shows rather than naming the convention when asked to explain.

Sport: Involves enough physical activity that a 70-year-old has no chance to defeat an equally-skilled 20-year-old. Game: The level or physical activity is such that equally-skilled 20- and 70-year-olds have about equal chances of winning. (For partnership/team activities, substitute "partnership of" or "team of" as appropriate.) Before anyone else objects: these are ideals, no activity will conform strictly to either definition. There is a clear continuum--but most activities will fall closer to one end than the other. You will be able to cite some interesting edge cases, I could do so myself if I felt like doing the research. Given this definition I assert confidently that basketball is a sport and bridge is a game. The question of whether both types of activities deserve government subsides, tax exemptions, etc. is a different question. My own vote is a loud YES for both sports and games.

P > 1NT > X > 1♠

Quite sufficient--it may backfire if partner misreads that hand, but may gain if declarer does. A legitimate falsecard.

I think that woodych's virtually 50% record given the stage of learning bridge indicated by his questions is very impressive--back in the days when I was at that stage, I would be flattering myself to claim a 45% average. No question that his partner was full of ....

Both asleep at the switch. South could easily try 4♥ or 2♣, but this is pretty easy 1 ♠ response to 1♥ as well. Allocation of blame depends on South's opening tendencies. If South's 1♥ in third seat might be a crappy flattish 9, North's pass doesn't look so bad--for all he knows, NS may need to get out NOW. If South is sure to have reasonable strength or compensating shape, the pass is terrible. North's opening tendencies in first seat have some influence: the lighter he opens, the less bad South's 1♥ is, and incidentally, the better 4♥ looks compared to 2♣ if he does go stronger. With some of the wild men I've partnered an opening pass tends to deny a decent 11 or a shapely 10: slam is quite out of the question. Yes, we were playing 2 over 1, not Precision.

The meaning in North American 2 over 1 as I understand it is that 4M when 3M would have set trumps is a picture bid, excellent trumps (usually AKQxxxx or better), values (not necessarily support, Kx would be fine) in partner's suit--and no first- or second-round control in the unbid suits. Partner will usually pass due to lack of controls, but if partner has adequate controls he can freely try for or bid slam without worrying about trump quality.

I believe that OP means or should mean anti-(partnership-style)=not our partnership style, not (anti-partnership) style=disruptive to most partnerships. Given a choice of splinter vs Jacoby, I choose splinter. But I would prefer to be playing a style where I can bid 2♥.

This is a fairly common way to play it. Edgar Kaplan called this type of opener's rebid "forcing if you have a real response (six points)".

5♣ stands out a mile--strengthen the trumps to ♣ KQJ... and I would consider opening 6♣ if in a partnership that wouldn't take this as a 12-trick hand.

A good point--the arguments for 4♠ assume SAYC/2 over 1 bidding by the opponents, where the 4♥ is almost certain (barring unskilled opponents). These are reasonable arguments, though I am not persuaded in this particular case--and I might be wrong. Against a Precision pair, where this raise could easily be a flat 13-14 unsuitable for slam, bidding 4♠ is suicide. The quick, uninformative 1M-4M sequences (with or without intervention) are Precision's greatest strength, which I say as someone who has played one variety or another of Precision since the late 70's. IJO's as a countermeasure is a most interesting idea.

I will bid at any vulnerability, but it is close if vulnerable. It is an obvious bid at neither vulnerable--at favorable, you can't hold this hand unless you don't know how to preempt.

Lacking tools like Exclusion, I like direct 6♠ best. I can't imagine partner going to seven without both ♠A and ♦A, and it is hard to imagine him not bidding it if he does have them. In any case, your actual result was fine: 6♠ making seven always outscores 7♠ making six (=down 1)!

A question: what would 1♠ instead of the negative double have shown? I have had partnerships where X=exactly 4 spades and 1♠=5+ spades--in this case, support doubles should be off, and partner's failure to double 2♣ should indeed tend to deny as much as five good clubs--making a better case for pass as the final call.

My estimate of the probabilities tell me to go low--if partner has no help and the breaks are bad, this "eleven trick" hand might only take nine, losing a trump, ♥A and two clubs. Obviously this is unlikely, but I can't stomach 6♠ looking for specific cards when 4♠ might go down. I recognize this as a "go for it or give it up" hand, there is no question I can ask that partner will know how to answer, so I have to decide by myself. I go low with 4♠--after all, 4 making 6 scores at least as well as 6 making 4 every time.

Used with reasonable judgement this is a very useful technique--the cheapest sacrifice against 6♥ may well be getting them to accept 480/680 in 4♥. The same concept can apply at the game level: give the a chance to play 3♥, and it will likely be cheaper than going down in 4♠ if they do so--also works wonders if your sac would have been a phantom.

Agreed, using judgement is not mastering. But consider this possibility: my partner and I have agreed to open 5M-3-3-2 hands 1NT and it is my honest judgement that this hand is sufficiently strong for a 15-17 no trump (or we play a 14-16 strong NT as is played by some 2/1 partnerships). Now is it masterminding to keep my partnership agreement and open 1NT? This is not the same question as "is this hand so suit oriented that I should break agreement and open 1♥ on these cards?". I would do so--I believe it it a lesser lie to say this hand has six hearts than to say it is no trump. oriented.

Forget you ever heard of this--getting behind this method was Ron Klinger's worst bridge error (not that he's made a lot of them--on the topic on hand evaluation, his work on LTC is quite good). Take the example hand -- totally flat but with three aces. If playing weak no trump, this is one, if playing strong notrump open 1♣. Even thinking about passing this hand is a monstrous underbid.

Try playing some sessions with a regular partner where you agree that neither Gerber nor Blackwood are played--yes no way to ask for aces. Lean the techniques of showing controls, extra strength, and trick sources. When you can do this fairly well, you will recognize certain hands that would be simplified by asking for aces; now change you agreement to Blackwood, using Gerber instead if and only if 4♣ is bid as a jump directly after a 1NT or 2NT bid that is your side's first natural bid of the auction. Examples: 1NT-4♣ = Gerber 2NT-♣ = Gerber2♣-2♦-2NT-4♣ = Gerber1♦-1♠-1NT-4 = not Gerber2♣-2♠-2NT-4♣ = not Gerber

If this sequence is a forcing pass situation for your partnership (I think it should be), Pass Double Inversion should apply here: Direct suit bids = long suit. X = takeout (though often converted at this level) P =asks partner to double (he will unless he has a freak) then pass for penalties or bid cheapest with two places to play.

No LA to 3NT: 8 sure tricks and if West leads hearts, he may hand you the ninth -- if partner has a 0-count. No bridge player I know would play him to be that weak on this auction even if he had fast passed: they'd gamble on finding a useful queen or so.

I have heard of this (though I don't use it): Be within 1 trick of your bid at unfavorable. Be within 2 tricks of your bid at both vulnerable.. Be within 3 tricks of your bid at neither vulnerable. Be within 4 tricks of your bid at favorable. I find that this rule makes vulnerable preempts too conservative for my taste. My own preference is the rule of 2,3,4: Be within 2 tricks at unfavorable. Be within 3 tricks at equal. Be within 4 tricks at favorable. With the understanding that doubtful hands go low vulnerable and go high not vulnerable.